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Decisions construing the statute set out above indicate that
the legislative policy is to give neither side of the controversy
an unfair advantage and to provide for direct action against the
insurance carrier only when certain conditions precedent occur.
In Luft v. Factory Mutual Liability Insurance Company of America,6 the Rhode Island court said:
The insurer cannot be joined in any action against
the insured, and only when the insured cannot be served
with process may this action be brought directly against
the insurer. The insurer's liability is in the nature of a
surety whose obligation is limited to the contractual obligation under the insurance policy.
To further safeguard the insurer in an action brought directly
against it, the plaintiff must establish his case exactly as though
the insured was the defendant, and every defense available to
7
the insured is available to the insurer.
While the Rhode Island statute requires the "non est" return
as a prior condition to bringing a direct action against the insurance carrier, direct action is allowed.
Judicial decisions and present rules of procedure, you explain
to your client, mark a great advance over the common law and
the code yet much remains to be desired. Finally, as your client
succumbs to the tedium of your remarks, you inform him that
the real party in interest in any negligence and casualty case
remains the hidden foe beyond the pale of the real party in interest
statutes, and with a final rhetorical flourish you ask him, is legislation the answer?

THE SELLER OF ONE MINK COAT v.
PVT. JOHNNIE DOE
FRANCES HICKEY SCHALOW
of the Denver Bar, Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of La6v

Judgment for whom in the above designated action? '35 C.S.A.
Ch. 83 Sec. 10 provides as follows:
The expenses of the family and the education of the
children are chargeable upon the property of both husband
and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they
may be sued jointly or separately.
The language in the decisions under the statute seems to
leave no doubt that Johnnie would be liable for the purchase as a
"family expense" if his wife bought and wore the coat herself
during a time when they were living together.' But the Supreme
6Luft v. Factory Mut. Liability Insurance Co., 51 R.I. 452, 155 A. 797.
'Ibid.
IGilman v. Mathews, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 P. 366; Houck v. La Junta Hardware Co., 50 Colo. 228, 114 P. 645; Straight v. McKay, 15 Colo. App. 60, 60
P. 1106.
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Court has held the statute doesn't apply when the spouses are
"living apart" because, then, there is no "family," and the hus-2
band's liability is dependent on the article's being a necessary.
We shall assume that, on a private's pay, a mink coat is not.
If, then, the purchase is made while Johnnie and his wife are
happily married, but he is stationed away from her and his Colorado home, are the spouses still "living together" in the sense
required for application of the statute?
Let us first determine how our court has defined the term
"family."
Gilman v. Mathews, supra, concerned an action brought
against a husband and wife for clothing sold to the husband. A
judgment against the wife was reversed because there had been
no allegation or evidence that "any family relation existed between the defendants; nothing to show that there was any family,
or that defendants were living together" at the time the purchase
was made. The admission that the defendants were husband and
wife was not enough to bring the debt within the provisions of
the statute. In defining the term "family," the court said:
A family is defined to be a collective body of persons
who live in one house and under one management.
Substantially the same definition was later applied in a decision concerning goods sold to a husband and wife, some of which
were used by their servants. 3 The court held that servants, living
in the household, were included in the term "family."
In Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester, supra, the court, in holding the statute did not apply because the spouses were living
apart (either by mutual consent or because of the fault of the
wife)' at the time of the purchases, spoke as follows: "As the
Jesters were not living together as a family in fact, at the time
the goods were sold, it is conceded that the statute . . . relative
to family expenses has no application." (Italics mine.) And in
O'Brien v. Galley-Stockton Shoe Co., supra, the court pointed out
that the wife and children were "living separate and apart, and in
a different house, from the defendant" at the time of the purchase and therefore the statute had no application. In the latter
case, the reason for the separation was not disclosed.
In none of the Colorado cases, however, do we find a disclosure that the husband and wife were living apart "involuntarily," or simply because, though "friendly" they preferred separate home or found them expedient for other reasons. Let us,
then, look at the language of the courts construing family expense statutes which have been held to apply under these circumstances.
'Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester, 60 Colo. 290, 152 P. 903; O'Brien v.
Galley-Stockton Shoe Co., 65 Colo. 70, 173 P. 544; Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo.
509, 216 P. 259; See also: Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P. 2d 953.
. Perkins v. Morgan, 36 Colo. 360, 85 P. 640.
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Two Washington cases are of interest. The first 4 concerns the
liability of a wife for the medical and hospital expenses of her
husband who was working in Washington while the wife was in
Pennsylvania. The court applied the statute because "it does not
follow from that fact alone that the family relationship had in a
legal sense been severed." Further, the court said,
It is not necessary that the husband and wife shall
at all times reside under the same roof, in order that
the legal status of the family may be preserved. It is a
matter of common knowledge that many husbands in their
struggles for a livelihood are often required to be far from
home and for long periods of time and that such enforced
absences are in behalf of the family, in order that the
comforts of life may be provided for them .... It will not
do to say that in such cases the family status is destroyed
by somewhat continued absense of the husband.
In the above case, the wife had indulged in certain acts of
tenderness toward the husband during his illness and had paid
a portion of the hospital bill before his death. After deciding
that the wife was liable under the statute, the court cited Gilman
v. Mathews, supra, and stated that the Colorado court's views
"may not be altogether in harmony with what we have hereinbefore said concerning the nature of the facts which may be sufficient to establish the legal existence of the family relation."
In the second case, 5 the parties were living separately because
of the wife's confinement in a mental institution. There, the court
said, . . . both spouses, if living in the marriage relation, constitute a family." (Italics mine.) Further, ". . . it is not always
necessary, in law, that, in order to constitute a family, the members thereof reside together under one roof," a statement obviously
contrary to that of our court in Gilman v. Mathews, supra. The
case held the statute applies "provided the marital relationship
has not been severed and there has been no intentional separation." (Italics mine.)
In a late Washington case, 6 the court held the husband not
liable for the board bill of his deceased wife incurred after their
separation by mutual consent and before she had instituted divorce proceedings. Though the case is not strictly in point on
our issue, the following language of the court is of interest:
In order to interpret the statute in question which
deals specifically with the family relationship, we must
distinguish a marital relationship from a family relationship . . . . There is a marriage without a family
where the spouse or either of them fail and refuse to discharge all of their reciprocal obligations and live separate
Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 664, 82 P. 998.
In re De Nisson's Guardianship, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P. 2d 1024.
'Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wash. 2d 977, 168 P. 2d 404.
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and apart from each other. Where a spouse by words or
conduct, evidences an intention not to maintain the marriage state in its family aspects and disavows all marital
obligations, the other is freed from the liabilities incident to the marital status which are based upon the reciprocal aspects of the relationship. (Italics mine.)
It is worthy of note that the Washington court has apparently not held the husband liable for the necessaries of the wife
when the spouses were living apart through mutual consent or
the fault of the husband as our court held in Bauer v. Abrahams,
supra, and, therefore that court's interpretation of the statute
might well tend to be broader than ours.
A Utah case 7 includes dictum that the statute should apply
when the husband and wife are "merely temporarily living apart
and where the family relation has not in fact been severed."
Two Illinois cases are also in point. In the first,8 the husband
had spent substantially all of the nine months period in which
the goods were charged away from the wife, but he visited her
a half dozen or so times during the separation and during the
visits he was "treated as one of the family." The court said, "We
are unable, from this evidence, to find that there was any such
separation as the law recognizes." In the second, 9 the court said,
"In view of . . . the fact that defendant and his wife, though
having separate homes, lived together as husband and wife and
were, therefore, a family, we are satisfied that the coat was a
family expense for which the defendant is liable."
The above cases are certainly authority for the proposition
that a separation caused entirely by military duty is not the type
of "separation" which prevents the application of the family expense statute to a debt incurred by the wife. But, if representing
the plaintiff in our hypothetical action, I could not feel too confident of success in view of our court's reiterated definition of a
"family", nor in view of its quotation with approval from Schlessinger v. Keith, 30 Ill. App. 253,10 which said, "appellants" (sellers
of the goods to the wife) "had no notice of such separation.
Neither had the husband any notice that the wife was buying
goods." (Italics mine.)
Perhaps the real answer lies in determining the reason for
the requirement that the family must be "living together" in order
for the statute to apply. Is it because when the husband and
wife are living apart in a manner in which their mutual obligations are not being discharged, their mutual liability should also
fall, as indicated by the Washington cases? Or is it because only
when the husband and wife are together does each have any deBerow v. Shields, 48 Utah 270, 159 P. 538.
'Hudson v. King Brothers, 23 IMl. App. 118.
'Louis Berman and Co., Inc. v. Dahlberg, 336 Ill. App. 233, 83 N. E. 2d 380.
1oGilman v. Mathews, supra.
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gree of control over the other's expenditures, as indicated by the
Illinois case?
Maybe, one day, Pvt. Johnnie Doe will have his answer.

FOURTH ANNUAL LAW INSTITUTE
The Fourth Annual Law Institute, jointly sponsored by the
Junior Bar Sections of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
and the College of Law of the University of Denver will be in
progress beginning April 14 and ending May 5. The Institute will
be held in Room 314, Business Administration Building of the
University of Denver, 1445 Cleveland Place.
The subject of the Institute this year is Estate Planning. The
subject will be treated in a series of seven late afternoon sessions,
from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. each Monday and Wednesday, featuring
instruction by members of the profession well qualified by their
research and experience in estate management.
Cooperating with the Junior Bar in the undertaking is the
Rocky Mountain Chapter of the American Society of Chartered
Life Underwriters who are providing instruction on the place of
life insurance in planning an estate, the underwriting of plans
for liquidating a decedent's interest in a business venture, veteran
and social security retirement plans, and related subjects.
The detailed program, a copy of which has been mailed separately to all members of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations,
is planned to outline the factors which must be considered by
attorneys in order best to serve the interests of their clients. It is
hoped that the Institute will be of especial benefit to the younger
members of the bar.

BOOK TRADERS CORNER
William M. Swift offers for sale a sizeable library of law books,
all in good condition, in which is included volumes 1 through 27
of the Colorado Appeals, volumes 1 through 96 of the Colorado
Reports, volumes 1 through 105 of the Iowa Reports and volumes
1 through 104 of the Northeastern Reporter series.
For further information concerning this library you are invited to contact Mr. Swift at 2118 North Tejon Street, Colorado
Springs, Colorado.

